List of games in Chapter 6 Perfect Information

Using Comlabgames


Game title

 (right click on the game to download it)

Short description of the experiment

Game 6.1: Adjustment costs

A game with costly adjustment between two competitors of different size. Because of its high adjustment costs, the market value of the large firm is higher from stagnating if the small firm does too. The capitalized value of the small firm however increases from modernizing regardless of what the large firm does. Moreover if the small firm modernizes but the large one stagnates, the small firm gains a significant proportion of the business that previously belonged to the large firm. Finally we assume that the small firm is able to react to the plans of the large firm because it has lower lead times. Thus the large firm must choose between stagnating and modernizing before the small firm. Notice that this process is modeled as a game of perfect foresight because, nature does not play a role, and because the small player knows exactly what the large player has done before making its own decision.

Game 6.2: Congestion

Three sun bathers sequentially arrive at a beach, which is a mixture of whom have the same preferences over sand and rock. There is an abundance of places that differ only marginally in their desirability, the most desirable rocky spot yields 10 utils for the day, the second most desirable rocky spot 9 utils and so on. Sand, however, is scarce but common property. If only one person lies on the sand then her utility is 20, but if two lie there the utility of each person is only half that. It falls even further if three crowd on the same patch.

Game 6.3: Market saturation

At the beginning of the game a potential entrant decides whether to enter a whale watching tour boat industry in an isolated vacation resort which is currently served by a single operator. There is a fixed entry cost of  $1 million for the new entrant for plant, and constant variable costs. The monopoly rent from this industry is $4 million.


Game 6.4: Allience

This is a game for 5 players, each of whom takes turns to stop play from progressing further. Regardless of when play stops, the sum of the payoffs to all players is 15, one player receiving 1, another 2, and so forth up to 5. Payouts at the terminal nodes are only distinguished by how the payouts of 1 through 5 are assigned.

Game 6:5: Principle agent problem designed in free form

There are two players: the firm and the builder. The firm moves first and has two choices. The firm can either offer a contract or not. If no contract is offered, then the game ends. If the firm offers a contract then the builder has to decide whether to accept it or not. If the builder rejects the contract, the game ends. If the builder accepts the contract, then the builder has to decide whether to put a high effort or a low effort.

Game 6:6: Principle agent problem designed in extensive form, low wage=2, high wage=2

Game 6.7: Principle agent problem designed in extensive form, low wage=2, high wage=4.

Game 6.8: Air service

There are two players that compete in the same industry: Cheetah Air and Eagle Air. Cheetah Air has two choices: to create a route or not to create a route but does not know the demand for the route when the decision has to be made. When Eagle Air is deciding between Entering or not entering the same market he does not know the demand either but he knows Cheetah Air decision.

Game 6.9: Air service redrawn

Game 6.10: Air service with expected value

Game 6.11: Innovator and venture capitalist

An innovator is seeking funds for a project. Neither the innovator not the venture capitalist knows if the project has a commercial value. Innovator has to decide to ignore opportunity or seek funding. Venture capitalist decides between funding and not funding if he is approached by venture capitalist.

Game 6.12: Innovation and venture capitalist redrawn

Game 6.13: Philips and Sony (Demand for CD players)

Philips has a dilemma: to build a factory immediately or Wait. If they build immediately they will not know the buyer’s demand. If they wait for a year the demand will be know but they have a risk of Sony entering the market. However Sony does not observe the demand when they make decision to build or not to build.

Game 6.14: Philips and Sony redrawn