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List of
games in Chapter 10 Complete Information Using Comlabgames |
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Game
title (right click on the game to download it) |
Short
description of the experiment |
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Game 10.1: Industrial
dispute in the extensive form |
This is a game
between a coal company and the union. The most recent major dispute has been
at the company's major mine which is a 5.5 million ton per year operation
with approximately 550 employees. The union has been seeking to achieve a
collective agreement at the mine for almost two years. However, the company
has not been interested in a collective agreement. After almost two years of
bargaining, the company started to offer individual employment contracts
which included a pay rise of around 5%. It hoped that workers who were
frustrated with the lack of a pay rise in two years would take up on the
offer. The offer requires the individual to give up their right to be
represented by the union in negotiations over pay and working conditions, and
to work as directed by the company all the times. Company believed it would
win 10% of the workforce to non-union individual contracts immediately, and
then the majority of the workforce within a few weeks. The union had a choice
to ignore the company's action with respect to individual contracts or to
initiate a strike to achieve a collective agreement quickly and to stop
gradual defections from the union. Under Australian industrial law the union
is allowed to strike indefinitely (and the company to lock out workers)
during collective bargaining. The union sustained the striking workforce
through the payment of strike pay which was financed by a levy of US$7 per
week on all other members in the coal mining industry. The workers returned
to work after the company agreed to a set of intensive bargaining talks.
While precise levels of utility are hard to caculate
for these kinds of scenarios, it is relatively straightforward to infer what
the rankings of orderings of the payoffs, |
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Game 10.2: Industrial dispute in the strategic form |
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Game 10.3: Vertical integration – original game |
The second player
has the opportunity to move at the same time as the first but also retains an
option to wait and see. For example a component supplier for a manufacturer
that assembles parts can scale of a run versus the inventory costs easier to
mark the part on a long run rather than produce supply on a short notice. |
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Game 10.5: Vertical
integration in the strategic form |
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Game 10.6: Strategic alliance in the extensive form |
The cooperation between companies may take on a more
formal character, or alternatively might be based on informal understanding
that is not fully articulated in any written agreement. The game models a
large company approaching a smaller company seeking to capitalize on its
joint activities. The advantage of an informal partnership is its flexibility
that provides both companies with opportunities to increase profit. By way of
comparison companies sometimes see the mutual value from coordinating their
activities without directly forming a partnership. Sometimes a second mover
has partial information about what a previous player has chosen. |
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Game 10.7: Strategic alliance in the strategic form |
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Game 10.8: Investment broker in the extensive form game |
There are two players in this game, a client and a broker.
The client of an investment firm does not know how much attention her broker
pays to anticipating changes in future returns to tech stocks versus
industrials. At the initial node the broker chooses which type of stock he
will follow most closely. Then nature reveals to his client whether the
fluctuations in the economy are indicative of radical shift in technology or
merely a prospect that ultimately was not realized. Since she follows
business news herself the client is savvier than most investors, and thus has
the opportunity to liquidate her position before the ramifications of the
shock are apparent to everybody. At this point nature could have another turn
with probabilities that techs versus industrials do well, and then the
payoffs could be realized. |
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Game 10.9: Investment broker in the strategic form game |
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Game 10.10: Manufacturing aircraft in the extensive form |
There are four
pure strategies open to each player. The engine manufacturer could bribe the
Thai government and then locate in either country, or alternatively decide
against bribing |
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Game 10.11: Manufacturing aircraft in the strategic form |
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